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The Policy Views of Partisan  
Election Officials* 
David C. Kimball,** Martha Kropf,*** Donald Moynihan,****  
Carol L. Silva,***** and Brady Baybeck****** 
In the debate about partisan election administration, little attention 
has been focused on the views of local election officials. Election officials 
can be purveyors of partisanship as well as observers of the election 
administration environment. We use a series of national surveys of local 
election officials to examine the degree to which local officials of opposing 
parties have different policy preferences about election administration. We 
find that partisan differences are largely confined to officials serving heavily 
populated local jurisdictions. We also examine whether partisanship is 
related to the views of local officials toward state election administration. 
We find evaluations of state administrators have less to do with party 
affiliation and more to do with outside forces largely beyond their control. 
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Three presidential election cycles beyond the fateful 2000 elections, and a 
decade beyond the passage of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA),1 
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research presented in this Article. We alone are responsible for the analyses and conclusions. 
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Science and Public Administration, University of North Carolina at Charlotte. **** Professor of 
Public Affairs, University of Wisconsin–Madison. ***** Associate Professor of Political Science, 
University of Oklahoma. ****** Associate Professor of Political Science, Wayne State University. 
1. Help America Vote Act of 2002, 42 U.S.C. §§ 15301–15545 (2006). 
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scholars, journalists, and advocates still debate election procedures.2 One major 
reform that has not received serious attention from policymakers is to change the 
way in which most local election officials are chosen.3 Some advocate switching to 
more independent and nonpartisan election officials at the state and local level.4 In 
part, this is a reaction to instances of partisan election officials behaving 
incompetently or in ways that seem designed to further the interests of their 
political party rather than those of the broader voting public.5 
Furthermore, many observers lament the decentralized nature of election 
administration in the United States.6 In this country, there are thousands of local 
officials managing elections in counties or towns, and local officials vary in terms 
of their party affiliation and the manner in which they are chosen. Almost two-
thirds of local election officials (LEOs) are elected to their positions (the 
remainder are appointed).7 For approximately half of local election officials, their 
affiliation with one of the two major political parties is a critical feature of the 
selection process.8 This local variation provides scholars with some leverage to 
examine the impact of different methods for selecting LEOs. For example, some 
evidence indicates that election officials who are elected behave differently than 
appointed officials.9 In some instances, it appears that Democratic election 
officials behave differently than Republican officials.10 Interestingly, the attitudes 
 
2. See, e.g., Nonpartisan Election Officials, FAIRVOTE, http://archive.fairvote.org/?page=70 (last 
visited Aug. 29, 2012). 
3. MARTHA KROPF & DAVID C. KIMBALL, HELPING AMERICA VOTE: THE LIMITS OF 
ELECTION REFORM 96–100 (2012); see also RICHARD L. HASEN, THE VOTING WARS: FROM 
FLORIDA 2000 TO THE NEXT ELECTION MELTDOWN 105–10 (2012) (describing an Ohio secretary 
of state’s controversial election decisions in 2008 involving instructions given to local election 
officials). 
4. See, e.g., Daniel P. Tokaji, The Future of Election Reform: From Rules to Institutions, 28 YALE L. & 
POL’Y REV. 125, 131–37 (2009); Nonpartisan Election Officials, supra note 2; Robert A. Pastor, 
Nonpartisan Election Administration: Model Legislation for the States, AM. UNIV. CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & 
ELECTION MGMT. (July 15, 2009), http://www.american.edu/spa/cdem/upload/nonpartisanmodel 
legislation08-2009.pdf. 
5. HEATHER K. GERKEN, THE DEMOCRACY INDEX: WHY OUR ELECTION SYSTEM  
IS FAILING AND HOW TO FIX IT 16–23 (2009); Daniel P. Tokaji, Lowenstein Contra Lowenstein: Conflicts 
of Interest in Election Administration, 9 ELECTION L.J. 421, 422 (2010); see also HASEN, supra note 3,  
at 21–23. 
6. GERKEN, supra note 5, at 20–23; HASEN, supra note 3, at 2–5; Tokaji, supra note 4, at 141 
(“[Decentralization] does not eliminate the problems that exist when a state chief election official 
employs considerable discretion to administer state election law in a manner that benefits his or her 
party.”). 
7. David C. Kimball & Martha Kropf, The Street-Level Bureaucrats of Elections: Selection Methods for 
Local Election Officials, 23 REV. POL’Y RES. 1257, 1261 (2006). 
8. See id. at 1259–61. 
9. See Barry C. Burden et al., The Effect of Administrative Burden on Bureaucratic Perception of Policies: 
Evidence from Election Administration, 72 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 741, 748 (2012). But see Martha Kropf et al., 
Representative Bureaucracy and Partisanship: The Implementation of Election Law, 73 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 242, 
248 (2013) (finding no difference between elected and appointed officials in terms of attitudes toward 
provisional voting). 
10. See, e.g., David C. Kimball et al., Helping America Vote? Election Administration, Partisanship, 
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expressed by local election officials have received relatively little study, in spite of a 
rather longstanding assumption by many scholars that the attitudes of government 
officials influence their behavior.11 Given the decentralized nature of election 
administration, local election officials may be less vigorous in enforcing election 
laws that they do not support.12 In addition, the relationship between a local 
official and the state officer running elections has received even less attention—
how does partisanship affect the perceptions of local officials toward the state 
officials? 
The purpose of this Article is to examine the attitudes of local election 
officials toward election policies and about the perceived level of contentiousness 
in their local jurisdiction and in their state. Election officials can be both 
purveyors and observers of partisan conflict in election administration. Do 
Democratic and Republican officials have different election policy preferences? 
Do local officials perceive that partisan conflict permeates election administration 
in their state or locality? How does the partisanship of the top state election 
official affect that perception? In the last few years, a series of national surveys of 
local election officials have been conducted. We merged data from three such 
surveys with data on the selection method and partisanship of local election 
officials.13 Two of the surveys were conducted under the auspices of the 
Congressional Research Service (2005 and 2007)14 and the other under the Pew 
Center on the States.15 These data allowed us to examine the degree to which 
partisanship correlates with the observations and policy preferences of local 
election officials. 
These surveys also allowed us to examine whether partisanship affects what 
is a key relationship in most, if not all, states: the relationship between state and 
local election officials. In particular, we could examine whether having a partisan 
state official affects the perception of conflict in local jurisdictions and satisfaction 
with the state election office. If the party affiliations of state and local officials 
have little bearing on these perceptions, then one may wonder whether a move to 
nonpartisan administrators would substantially change the relationship between 
state and local election officials. 
 
and Provisional Voting in the 2004 Presidential Election, 5 ELECTION L.J. 447, 448–50 (2006); Kropf et al., 
supra note 9, at 247–50; Guy Stuart, Databases, Felons, and Voting: Bias and Partisanship of the Florida Felons 
List in the 2000 Elections, 119 POL. SCI. Q. 453, 461–63 (2004). 
11. Kenneth J. Meier, Representative Bureaucracy: A Theoretical and Empirical Exposition, 2 RES. 
PUB. ADMIN. 1, 4–5 (1993); Sally Coleman Selden et al., Bureaucracy as a Representative Institution: Toward 
a Reconciliation of Bureaucratic Government and Democratic Theory, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 717, 718–19 (1998). 
12. E.g., Kropf et al., supra note 9, at 247–48. 
13. Kimball & Kropf, supra note 7, at 1261–62. 
14. Donald P. Moynihan & Carol L. Silva, The Administrators of Democracy: A Research Note  
on Local Election Officials, 68 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 816, 816 (2008). 
15. David C. Kimball & Brady Baybeck, Are all Jurisdictions Equal? Size Disparity in Election 
Administration, 12 ELECTION L.J. 130, 131–32 (2013); Back to Paper, ELECTIONONLINE.ORG (Feb. 17, 
2008), http://www.pewstates.org/uploadedfiles/pcs_assets/2008/eb21brief.pdf. 
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In general, we found considerable variation in the policy preferences of local 
election officials. However, in these different surveys of local election officials, we 
observed partisan differences in their policy views only in those jurisdictions that 
are heavily populated. In addition, LEO evaluations of the environment in which 
they work were more strongly influenced by outside forces, such as the 
presidential campaign and difficulties implementing HAVA, than by their own 
party affiliation. 
I. PARTISANSHIP IN ELECTION ADMINISTRATION 
A political environment characterized by increasing partisan polarization16 
and a series of competitive national elections, particularly the presidential election 
of 2000, have fueled a growing number of clashes over election procedures in the 
United States.17 In this climate, there is an increased perception that candidates 
and political parties may try to manipulate election laws and procedures for 
political gain.18 
In recent years, partisan conflicts are evident in legislative debates in 
Congress and in many state legislatures about photo ID requirements for voters, 
restoring voting rights for felons, purging inactive and ineligible voters from 
registration lists, Election Day (and Same Day) registration, curbs on registration 
efforts by outside groups, limits on early voting, and other election laws.19 In 
general, Democratic policy makers tend to prefer policies that reduce barriers to 
voting, while Republican lawmakers tend to prefer policies that reduce election 
fraud.20 In legislative debates, the two policy goals are often set in opposition and 
against one another in a zero-sum framework. For example, policies to combat 
fraud are often described by opponents as increasing barriers to voting.21 Similarly, 
policies to reduce voting barriers are often perceived by opponents as increasing 
opportunities for fraud.22 In addition, there is some evidence of partisan divisions 
in public opinion on election administration issues. For example, Republicans tend 
 
16. NOLAN MCCARTY ET AL., POLARIZED AMERICA: THE DANCE OF IDEOLOGY AND 
UNEQUAL RICHES 1–3 (2006); RICHARD G. NIEMI ET AL., Is the American Electorate Polarized?,  
in CONTROVERSIES IN VOTING BEHAVIOR 221, 223–27 (Richard G. Niemi et al. eds., 5th ed. 2011). 
17. HASEN, supra note 3, at 5; Richard L. Hasen, Beyond the Margin of Litigation: Reforming U.S. 
Election Administration to Avoid Electoral Meltdown, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 937, 946–59 (2005). 
18. Daniel P. Tokaji, Early Returns on Election Reform: Discretion, Disenfranchisement, and the Help 
America Vote Act, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1206, 1248 (2005). 
19. ROBERT PASTOR, AM. UNIV. CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & ELECTION MGMT., VOTER IDS 
ARE NOT THE PROBLEM: A SURVEY OF THREE STATES 3–4 (2008); Stuart, supra note 10, at 454–56, 
458–61. 
20. HASEN, supra note 3, at 6–8; KROPF & KIMBALL, supra note 3, at 100–01. 
21. See PASTOR, supra note 19, at 3. 
22. See HASEN, supra note 3, at 109–10 (discussing a dispute in Ohio over a five-day period 
during the 2008 election during which a person could simultaneously register to vote and cast an early 
ballot). 
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to believe that voter fraud and impersonation occur more frequently than 
Democrats do.23 
In terms of the administration of elections, there is some evidence of 
partisan differences in the implementation of election law across local 
jurisdictions. For example, Stuart found differences between Democratic and 
Republican local officials in Florida in their enthusiasm for purging voter 
registration lists.24 Other studies have found partisan differences in the 
administration and implementation of provisional voting.25 Recent research 
further indicates that partisan attitudes have a direct impact on program 
administration—at least in the administration of provisional voting.26 However, 
we do not yet know much about partisan differences in policy attitudes among 
local election officials.27 
This is not to say that we do not have some excellent information about 
LEO attitudes. In fact, Moynihan and Silva found a variety of attitudes toward 
recent federal election law changes due to local resource constraints, goal 
congruence, and willingness to accept federal involvement in elections.28 
However, we do not know whether such attitudes are rooted in partisanship. 
It would not be surprising to find partisan differences among LEOs. Political 
scientists argue that an individual’s attachment to a political party develops early in 
life and may even grow stronger with time.29 Officials may try to leave these 
attitudes at the courthouse steps, given the job, but there appears to be a conflict 
of interest between serving one’s political party and serving the public interest.30 
For example, in the case of provisional voting, there is some evidence that 
partisanship does affect LEO attitudes and program administration.31 
Furthermore, LEOs operate in a partisan context where external forces are 
likely to affect the attitudes of officials and the implementation of election 
programs. State legislatures sometimes pass partisan legislation designed to tilt the 
electoral playing field in favor of the majority party.32 Partisan governors 
occasionally make demands on the way election officials do their jobs.33 Political 
parties and interest groups file lawsuits challenging election laws and 
 
23. Stephen Ansolabehere & Nathaniel Persily, Vote Fraud in the Eye of the Beholder: The Role of 
Public Opinion in the Challenge to Voter Identification Requirements, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1737, 1761 (2008). 
24. Stuart, supra note 10, at 461–62. 
25. HASEN, supra note 3, at 112, 148–49; KROPF & KIMBALL, supra note 3, at 103–06; Kimball 
& Kropf, supra note 7, at 1258–59. 
26. Kropf et al., supra note 9, at 247–48. 
27. See Kimball & Baybeck, supra note 15, at 135–36. 
28. Moynihan & Silva, supra note 14, at 821–22. 
29. E.g., DONALD GREEN ET AL., PARTISAN HEARTS & MINDS: POLITICAL PARTIES AND 
THE SOCIAL IDENTITIES OF VOTERS 2–5 (2002). 
30. Tokaji, supra note 5, at 422, 431–35. 
31. Kropf et al., supra note 9, at 247. 
32. See, e.g., Tokaji, supra note 18, at 1207, 1220–24, 1228–29, 1242–43. 
33. See, e.g., Tokaji, supra note 4, at 134. 
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administrative practices.34 As Hasen notes, the annual number of election lawsuits 
in the United States has doubled since 2000.35 Activists and opinion leaders make 
provocative, and often unsubstantiated, claims about voter fraud or voter 
suppression.36 In an increasingly polarized body politic, all of these activities bring 
partisan conflict to state and local election officials whether they want it or not. 
And we cannot discount the idea that these external forces may also affect who is 
selected to be the person administrating elections in a particular jurisdiction—a 
person who may or may not share attitudes with the “powers that be” or the 
majority of the electorate. 
We also expect that the effects of partisanship on LEO policy preferences 
and attitudes regarding the contentiousness of the election environment will be 
conditioned by the size of the jurisdiction. Research indicates that partisan 
political activity is more prevalent in heavily populated local jurisdictions.37 This 
factor may have a direct effect on behavior—and the reported attitudes and 
perceptions of LEOs. Another reason to expect that partisan LEOs in larger 
jurisdictions think differently than those in smaller jurisdictions rests on the 
assumptions one makes about the nature of politics in a large jurisdiction. If one 
thinks that there is partisan manipulation on the part of “external forces” such as 
political parties, one can assume that manipulation is strategic; the parties will 
focus their efforts where they can influence the most voters in the most 
“important” elections and using the fewest resources. Therefore, since 
manipulating elections in heavily populated local jurisdictions could affect the 
outcome of relatively close statewide elections, then affecting the decisions of 
LEOs in large jurisdictions may be seen as more efficient. We expect that the 
same will hold for lawsuits and potential rule changes. In contrast, officials in 
smaller jurisdictions, because they serve so few voters, would have much less of an 
impact on the outcome of state elections. As a result, we expect that partisan 
disputes over election administration are most likely to be fought either at the 
state level or in large local jurisdictions. 
To summarize, we expect that jurisdiction size strengthens the impact of 
partisanship on the policy attitudes and perceptions of local election officials. If 
partisan disputes over election administration are more likely to occur in large 
jurisdictions, then it also seems logical to hypothesize that local officials in large 
jurisdictions are more likely to take a position in those disputes. As a result, party 
positions on election policies are more likely to be internalized by local officials in 
large jurisdictions. And, ultimately, political parties likely make more of an effort 
 
34. HASEN, supra note 3, at 134. 
35. Id. 
36. See, e.g., Ryan Joyce, Note, ACORN and the 2008 Presidential Election Campaign: Perspectives  
on Alleged Third-Party Voter-Registration Fraud, 71 U. PITT. L. REV. 313, 318–19 (2009). 
37. Kimball & Baybeck, supra note 15, at 132–33, 135. 
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to influence the selection of election officials in large jurisdictions than in small 
ones. 
However, it is not just jurisdiction size that affects perceptions of 
contentiousness and policy attitudes. We also expect that parties and their allies 
will make an extra effort to influence election administration in battleground 
states, the most competitive states in a presidential campaign. The presidency is by 
far the most influential elected position in American politics, and the presidential 
campaign dominates other contests in terms of the resources and personnel 
deployed. As a result, political parties pay special attention to manipulating 
election laws in states most likely to swing the outcome of a presidential election. 
It is no coincidence that Ohio and Florida, two perennial battleground states, are 
frequent targets of election legislation and litigation where the two major parties 
are on opposing sides.38 Thus, we expect that local officials working in 
battleground states will report more political conflict in election administration. In 
the rest of the Article, we examine data from surveys of local election officials to 
analyze the role of partisanship in their attitudes toward election administration. 
II. DATA 
We examined data from three national surveys of local election officials, 
conducted in 2005, 2007, and 2009. The 2005 and 2007 surveys were conducted in 
a similar fashion, shortly after the fall national elections and continuing into the 
spring of the following year. The sampling frame for these two surveys was based 
on a national database of local election officials created by the Election Reform 
Information Project, and samples were drawn using a stratified method based on 
the number of local jurisdictions in a state. The data were collected primarily by an 
electronic survey, with paper surveys mailed to nonrespondents. Each of the two 
surveys produced over 1500 respondents, a roughly forty percent response rate in 
each case. For more details on the 2005 and 2007 surveys of local election 
officials, see Moynihan and Silva (2008).39 
The 2009 survey of local election officials was conducted from December of 
2008 to March of 2009 based on a sampling frame of 10,370 local jurisdictions in 
the United States with responsibility for hiring and training poll workers. A 
stratified sample was drawn from that list based on the number of voters in each 
local jurisdiction. An electronic survey was sent to local officials with an e-mail 
address and a paper survey was mailed to the other local officials. The data 
collection produced 900 respondents, a response rate of thirty-one percent. The 
2009 survey is described in more detail by Kimball and Baybeck.40 For all three 
surveys, we matched the survey responses to data on the party affiliation and 
 
38. See Tokaji, supra note 18, at 1209–10, 1220–39. 
39. Moynihan & Silva, supra note 14, at 817–24. 
40. Kimball & Baybeck, supra note 15, at 131–32. 
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method of selection of the local election official. For the 2005 and 2007 surveys, 
the matched data on the partisanship and method of selection of local officials 
come from Kimball and Kropf.41 For the 2009 survey, the matched data were 
compiled separately for the jurisdictions in the survey sample.42 The appendix 
provides some evidence that each of the surveys provided a representative sample 
of local election officials in the United States. 
III. ELECTION POLICY PREFERENCES OF LOCAL OFFICIALS 
We first attempt to answer a fundamental question about election 
administrators. That is, do Democratic and Republican local election officials have 
different views about election law? We start by examining the ideological positions 
of local election officials. The 2007 national survey asked local officials to place 
themselves on an ideological scale from one (“strongly liberal”) to seven 
(“strongly conservative”). Figure 1 indicates that the ideological gulf between 
Democratic and Republican local officials is much more pronounced in large 
jurisdictions than in small jurisdictions. We defined a large local jurisdiction as one 
that serves more than 40,000 voters in a presidential election. Like the American 
public,43 local election officials, on average, identify somewhat more toward the 
conservative side of the ideological spectrum. In the more numerous small local 
jurisdictions, Republican officials are slightly more conservative than Democratic 
and nonpartisan local officials (a difference of just less than half a point on the 
seven-point ideology scale). However, in large jurisdictions the difference between 
the average Republican and average Democratic local official is more than one and 
a half points. As the figure shows, the partisan divide in ideology among local 
election officials is much more evident in large jurisdictions. 
The more important question is whether Republican and Democratic 
election officials have different preferences when it comes to particular election 
laws. One election policy that has been the subject of growing partisan 
disagreement is whether to require voters to show photo ID when they vote.44 In 
state legislative debates, photo ID laws have been strongly supported by 
Republicans and usually opposed by Democrats.45 Thus, one might expect 
Republican local election officials to be the strongest supporters of a photo ID 
requirement. The 2007 national survey included three questions about a photo ID 
requirement and its likely impact on elections. Support for a photo ID 
requirement was measured on a scale from zero to ten, with higher numbers 
 
41. Kimball & Kropf, supra note 7, at 1260–62. 
42. Kimball & Baybeck, supra note 15, at 135. 
43. ROSALEE A. CLAWSON & ZOE M. OXLEY, PUBLIC OPINION: DEMOCRATIC IDEALS, 
DEMOCRATIC PRACTICE (2d ed., 2013). 
44. PASTOR, supra note 19, at 3–8. 
45. Id. at 4. 
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indicating stronger support.46 We found considerable variation among the local 
election officials, although, on average, they leaned toward supporting a photo ID 
requirement. Approximately twenty-five percent of local officials gave a response 
less than four, and more than forty-five percent gave a response higher than seven. 
 
Figure 1: Mean LEO Political Ideology by Party Affiliation  
and Size of Jurisdiction47 
 
 
The results in Table 1 show that partisan differences in LEO attitudes 
toward photo ID requirements exist only in large jurisdictions. On average, 
Republican, Democratic, and nonpartisan local officials in small jurisdictions 
(those serving less than 40,000 voters) share the same views about photo ID: mild 
support for the requirement, a belief that it will modestly improve election 
security, and a belief that it will slightly reduce voter turnout. In contrast, we 
observed more polarized opinions among officials serving large jurisdictions. In 
large jurisdictions, Republican officials are substantially more supportive of the 
 
46. We do find stronger support for a photo ID requirement among officials from states that 
have already imposed that requirement. Support for a photo ID requirement is only weakly associated 
with perceptions of voter fraud. When asked to respond to a statement that deliberate voter fraud is a 
serious problem in their jurisdiction, over ninety percent of local officials strongly disagreed. 
47. Source: 2007 Survey of Local Election Officials. 
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photo ID requirement and more optimistic about its impact on election security 
and turnout than Democratic and nonpartisan local officials. 
 
Table 1: Mean Photo ID Attitudes by LEO Partisanship  
and Size of Jurisdiction48 
 
 
Support Photo 
ID 
Requirement 
Photo ID 
Impact on 
Security 
Photo ID 
Impact on 
Voter Turnout 
Jurisdiction Size Small Large Small Large Small Large 
LEO Party       
Republican 6.3 7.9* 2.4 3.4* -1.1 0.2* 
Democrat 6.3 4.9 2.4 1.5 -1.1 -1.4 
Other/Nonpartisan 6.2 4.5 2.5 1.6 -1.1 -1.8 
N 1030 199 1028 199 1025 199 
Note: Cell entries are group means for responses to each question. Large jurisdictions 
served at least 40,000 voters in the 2004 presidential election. Small jurisdictions served 
fewer than 40,000 voters. The support for photo ID scale ranges from zero (“[n]ot support 
at all”) to ten (“[e]xtremely supportive”). The impact on security scale ranges from negative 
five (“[l]ess secure”) to positive five (“[m]ore secure”). The impact on turnout scale ranges 
from negative five (“[d]ecreased turnout”) to positive five (“[i]ncreased turnout”). 
* Differences between Republican and other local election officials are statistically 
significant at p < 0.01. 
 
We found a very similar pattern in the 2009 national survey of local election 
officials. The survey included two questions about antifraud policies: (1) a photo 
ID requirement for all voters and (2) deleting names from registration lists if they 
do not match other state records.49 The survey also included two questions about 
proposals to make voter registration easier: (1) Election Day registration and (2) 
automatically registering all citizens over eighteen years of age.50 Officials rated 
their preference for each policy on a scale from one (“[s]trongly oppose”) to five 
(“[s]trongly favor”).51 We expected to find that Republican local officials are more 
supportive of the antifraud policies while Democratic officials offer more support 
for the policies to ease voter registration. Among these four items, the antifraud 
measures are more popular among local officials than policies to ease voter 
registration. We again found substantial variation in support for these election 
 
48. Source: 2007 Survey of Local Election Officials.  
49. Kimball & Baybeck, supra note 15, at 135. 
50. Id. 
51. Id. 
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policies. Each item has a standard deviation greater than 1.2. Given that each item 
has a range of four, the standard deviation figures indicate considerable variation 
in the election reform policy attitudes of local election officials. 
 
Table 2: Mean Support for Election Policies by LEO Partisanship  
and Size of Jurisdiction52 
 
 
Require 
Photo ID to 
Vote 
Delete Names 
if No Match to 
Other Lists 
Election Day 
Registration 
Automatic 
Registration 
Jurisdiction Size Small Large Small Large Small Large Small Large 
LEO Party         
Republican 3.9  4.1* 3.0  3.0* 1.5  1.4* 2.2  2.0* 
Democrat 3.9 3.2 2.9 2.4 1.6 1.9 2.3 2.5 
Other/Nonpartisan 3.7  3.6 3.1 2.8 3.2  2.3 2.6 2.6 
N 486 237 486 232 486 237 486 232 
Note: Cell entries are group means for responses to each question. The policy scales range 
from one (“[s]trongly oppose”) to five (“[s]trongly favor”). * Differences between Republican 
and Democratic local election officials are statistically significant at p < 0.01. 
 
We compared mean support for each of the four policies by partisanship and 
jurisdiction size in Table 2. Once again, we only observed significant differences 
between Democratic and Republican local officials in large jurisdictions. On the 
antifraud measures, local officials of each party in small jurisdictions tend to offer 
moderate support for a photo ID requirement and take a neutral position on “no 
match, no vote” policies. In large jurisdictions, Republican officials indicated 
stronger support for both antifraud policies than Democratic or nonpartisan 
officials. We tended to observe opposition among local officials, on average, to 
the two policies to make voter registration easier. In addition, the positions of 
Democrats and Republicans in small jurisdictions are very similar. In large 
jurisdictions, however, Republican officials are more opposed to Election Day 
registration and automatic registration than Democrats. We also observed stronger 
support for Election Day registration among nonpartisan officials than among 
either major party. This is likely due to the fact that nonpartisan local election 
officials are heavily concentrated in states that already allow Election Day 
registration, where the policy is more popular than in the rest of the nation. 
Overall, the survey data support a consistent conclusion. There are 
significant differences between the policy preferences of Democratic and 
Republican local officials serving heavily populated local jurisdictions but little to 
 
52. Source: 2009 Survey of Local Election Officials. 
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no partisan differences among election officials in small jurisdictions.53 On the one 
hand, local election officials serving in large jurisdictions are a relatively small 
fraction of the universe of local officials. That is, they comprise less than ten 
percent of local administrators in the United States. On the other hand, local 
administrators in large jurisdictions serve roughly seventy percent of the voters in 
national elections.54 Thus, a large number of voters may be affected if partisanship 
influences the way those officials administer elections. 
IV. EVALUATIONS OF STATE AND LOCAL CONDITIONS 
We also examined the attitudes of local election officials about the 
environment in which they work. We have some data to test whether local 
officials report partisan conflict as a problem in their work. The 2007 national 
survey asked local election officials to indicate the level of political conflict in the 
environment in which they operate. Local officials answered on a scale from zero 
(“not contentious at all”) to ten (“extremely contentious”). Figure 2 provides the 
distribution of responses to this question and it shows substantial variation. While 
the average official tended toward the perception of “less contentious,” thirty-five 
percent of officials reported more than a moderately contentious election 
environment. 
Two additional questions on the 2007 survey asked about state election 
administrators. One question asked local officials whether state election 
administration is independent of partisan politics. Respondents rated state 
administrators on a scale from zero (“not independent at all”) to ten (“very 
independent”). Figure 3 provides the distribution of responses. While local 
officials tended to report that state administration is independent of partisan 
politics, more than twenty-five percent of local officials placed their state 
administrators on the lower half of the scale. When we take the first two questions 
together, a significant minority of local officials reported a fair amount of political 
and partisan conflict in election administration. 
 
  
 
53. Id. 
54. Id. at 13. 
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Figure 2: How Politically Contentious Is Election Administration?55 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Is State Election Administration Independent of Partisan Politics?56 
 
 
 
55. Source: 2007 Survey of Local Election Officials. Note: The scale ranges from zero (“not 
contentious at all”) to ten (“extremely contentious”). 
56. Source: 2007 Survey of Local Election Officials. Note: The scale ranges from zero (“not 
independent at all”) to ten (“very independent”). 
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A final question asked local officials how satisfied they are with election 
administration in their state. Local officials responded on a scale from zero (“not 
satisfied at all”) to ten (“extremely satisfied”). The distribution of responses is 
pictured in Figure 4. The graph shows generally positive evaluations of state 
election administration—only fifteen percent of local officials chose responses in 
the bottom half of the scale. 
 
Figure 4: Satisfaction with State Election Administration57 
 
 
 
We conducted further analyses of responses to these three questions to 
assess whether evaluations of the state and local environment are shaped more by 
LEO party affiliation or by outside forces. One of the most important outside 
forces may be the party affiliation of the state official. But other forces may also 
influence how the official evaluates the election administration environment. Each 
of the items evaluating the election administration environment pictured above 
serves as a dependent variable in a regression function. We included several 
independent variables, described below, as predictors of the perceptions of local 
election officials. We did not find significant differences between Democratic, 
Republican, and nonpartisan local officials in their evaluations of state 
administrators and the local environment. Instead, the party affiliation of the top 
state election official may be more important for these evaluations. 
 
57. Source: 2007 Survey of Local Election Officials. Note: The scale ranges from zero (“not 
satisfied at all”) to ten (“extremely satisfied”). 
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We hypothesize that partisan conflict between the local official and the state 
administrator may influence assessments of state election administration. 
Specifically, evaluations of state administrators may be more favorable when both 
officials share the same party affiliation and more unfavorable when state and 
local officials come from opposing parties. Agency theory generally holds that 
conflict is likely to occur in governance when principals and agents hold different 
preferences.58 To test these hypotheses, we coded the party affiliation and method 
of selection for the top election official in each state. In most states, the top 
official is an elected and partisan secretary of state.59 For the time period covered 
by this study, fifteen states have an appointed state election official or board, 
although in most of those cases the appointment comes from the governor’s 
political party.60 In all but five states the top election office is affiliated with a 
major political party. Adding these variables to our data revealed that one-third of 
the local election officials shared the same party affiliation as the top state official, 
while roughly seventeen percent of local officials came from the opposite party as 
the state official. The remaining fifty percent were local officials who served in a 
nonpartisan or bipartisan capacity,61 and they serve as the baseline for comparison 
in our model. Our equation also includes independent variables indicating whether 
the top state official was elected (or not) and whether the top state election office 
was partisan. This allowed us to test whether local officials perceive more partisan 
politics when the state official is elected or partisan. 
We examined three variables that captured the influence of outside forces on 
evaluations of the election administration environment. One was a measure of the 
size of the local jurisdiction, calculated as the natural log of the number of voters 
in the 2004 presidential election. Because of the heightened level of partisan 
activity occurring in large jurisdictions, as discussed above, we expect local 
officials in larger jurisdictions to report higher levels of political conflict. In 
addition, large jurisdictions tend to present more challenges for election officials,62 
another reason to expect officials in large jurisdictions to offer a dimmer 
assessment of election administration. A second measure of outside forces is a 
dummy variable denoting the battleground states in the 2004 presidential election, 
as reported by Shaw.63 Because of the extra efforts of political parties in 
presidential campaigns, we expect local officials in battleground states to express 
more partisan conflict and less satisfaction with state election administration. 
The final outside force reflects the administrative burden imposed by 
 
58. R. Michael Alvarez & Thad E. Hall, Controlling Democracy: The Principal-Agent Problems  
in Election Administration, 34 POL’Y STUD. J. 491, 492 (2006). 
59. Kimball et al., supra note 10, at 452. 
60. Id.; Hasen, supra note 17, at 974–76. 
61. Kimball et al., supra note 10, at 452–53. 
62. Kimball & Baybeck, supra note 15, at 131–35. 
63. DARON R. SHAW, THE RACE TO 270: THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE AND THE CAMPAIGN 
STRATEGIES OF 2000 AND 2004, at 57–59 (2006). 
566 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 3:551 
 
HAVA.64 HAVA is the most significant federal election legislation in a generation. 
While the law provided funds for new voting equipment, HAVA also imposed 
several mandates on state and local election administrators.65 New policies can 
impose additional costs on administrators (in terms of budget, staff resources, and 
time taken away from other tasks). While HAVA is a federal law, it is administered 
by state actors,66 and so local officials may associate the burden of HAVA with 
their perception of state officials. Burden and colleagues found that the perceived 
administrative burden of election policies shape the attitudes of local election 
officials toward those policies and election administration more generally.67 We 
hypothesize that the local officials who reported more difficulty implementing 
HAVA would offer more negative assessments of election administration in their 
state and local jurisdiction. The 2007 survey also included eight questions about 
the difficulty of implementing various HAVA requirements. Local officials rated 
each item on a scale from zero (“not difficult at all”) to ten (“extremely difficult”). 
We created a scale by averaging the eight items.68 There is considerable variation 
in this measure—for the ten-point scale the standard deviation is two. In addition, 
local officials reported a fair amount of difficulty implementing HAVA, 
particularly the requirements for accessible voting for people with disabilities, 
provisional voting, and a central voter registration database.69 By estimating these 
models, we can examine whether evaluations of the election administration 
environment are influenced more by party affiliation or by outside forces. Since 
each dependent variable is measured on an ordinal scale, we modeled each 
equation as an ordinal logit function. The parameter estimates for each model are 
reported in Table 3. 
The results in Table 3 show that assessments of the election administration 
environment are shaped more by outside forces than by the party affiliation of 
election officials. Local officials see more partisan politics and have more negative 
evaluations of state officials when they face difficulty implementing HAVA’s 
requirements. In addition, officials in large jurisdictions report a more contentious 
environment and lower satisfaction with state administration than officials in 
smaller jurisdictions. The effects of the HAVA experience and jurisdiction size are 
substantially larger than the effects of other variables in the equation. We also 
found that local officials in battleground states reported more partisan politics and 
less satisfaction with respect to state administrators. Finally, local officials tend to 
view partisan politics in state administration in a negative light. Perceiving state 
 
64. Help America Vote Act of 2002 § 302, 42 U.S.C. § 15482 (2006). 
65. Id. § 15482(a). 
66. Id. 
67. Burden et al., supra note 9, at 741. 
68. The scale is sufficiently reliable (Cronbach’s  = 0.85). 
69. Moynihan & Silva, supra note 14, at 818–19. 
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administrators as independent of party politics is positively correlated with local 
satisfaction with state administrators (r = 0.41, p < 0.001). 
The impact of administrative burden is consistent with accounts of local 
election officials as a group that perceive themselves as beleaguered by an ongoing 
set of unfamiliar requirements that have made their life more difficult.70 As a 
result, the administrative burdens associated with their job have become a 
dominant frame by which they understand and interpret their policy 
environment.71 While partisan preferences might make local election officials 
more or less sympathetic to one policy change or another, it is likely that the 
desire to avoid new burdens will trump these preferences. 
 
Table 3: Predictors of LEO Assessments of Election Administration in 200772 
 
 Environment Is 
Politically 
Contentious 
State 
Administrator Is 
Independent 
Satisfied with 
State 
Administrator 
Explanatory Variable Coefficient (SE) Coefficient (SE) Coefficient (SE) 
Ballots Cast in 2004 (log) 0.22*** (.04) 0.01 (.04) 0.14*** (.04) 
Battleground State 0.18 (.13) 0.27* (.13) 0.58*** (.13) 
Difficulties with HAVA 0.13*** (.03) 0.11** (.03) 0.15*** (.03) 
State Official Is Elected 0.14 (.14) 0.01 (.14) 0.08 (.14) 
State Official Is Partisan 0.40* (.24) 0.54* (.25) 1.05*** (.25) 
Same Party as State 
Official 0.23* (.12) 0.22* (.12) 0.21* (.12) 
Opposite Party of State 
Official 0.24 (.15) 0.37* (.16) 0.03 (.15) 
N 
Model 2 (7 df) 
1116 
70.9*** 
1097 
29.8*** 
1150 
93.6*** 
Note: Each dependent variable is an ordinal scale that ranges from zero to ten. Cell 
entries are ordinal logit coefficients and standard errors. Estimates of the cut-points 
between ordinal categories are omitted. *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.1, two-
tailed. 
 
By comparison, party affiliation has little impact on assessments of state 
election administrators. Local officials who share the same party affiliation as the 
top state official and local officials whose party is the opposite of the state 
administrator have basically the same average evaluations of state election 
 
70. Id. at 819; Robert S. Montjoy, The Changing Nature . . . and Costs . . . of Election Administration, 
70 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 867, 868–70 (2010). 
71. Burden et al., supra note 9, at 741. 
72. Source: 2007 Survey of Local Election Officials.  
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administration. We found that nonpartisan local officials reported less partisan 
politics in state election administration and a less contentious administrative 
environment than partisan local officials, but the differences are substantively 
modest. The method of choosing the state election official (election versus 
appointment) has no bearing on local evaluations of the state administrators. 
Finally, local officials reported less satisfaction with state administrators in the 
three states with a balanced bipartisan state election board (Hawaii, Illinois, and 
New York). A bipartisan consensus is required to make decisions in these states, 
which can be difficult, and the election boards in Illinois and New York have a 
history of inaction.73 It may be the case that inaction at the state level is not 
appreciated by local election officials. Overall, local perceptions of partisanship 
and political conflict in election administration seem to be driven more by outside 
forces than by the party affiliation of election officials. 
V. WEAK SUPPORT FOR CIVIL SERVICE REFORM AMONG LOCAL OFFICIALS 
Finally, we found some evidence that local officials might not react favorably 
to proposals to reform the method of selecting election officials. The 2007 survey 
included a question asking whether local officials would favor a proposal to make 
election administration part of the civil service system in their state. Overall, 18% 
favored the proposal, 28% opposed it, and 54% offered no opinion. With the high 
rate of no opinion responses, there may be some room to persuade local officials 
of the merits of such a proposal. We did not observe partisan differences in 
responses to the question. However, not surprisingly, elected local officials 
reported less support than appointed officials for the civil service proposal (see 
Figure 5). Since most local officials are elected, and since state legislators tend to 
rely on local election officials as a cue on election reform proposals, this may pose 
a significant barrier to proposals for nonpartisan election administration. 
 
  
 
73. David C. Kimball, Illinois: Ending the Gridlock, in ELECTION REFORM: POLITICS AND 
POLICY 190, 194 (Daniel J. Palazzolo & James W. Ceaser eds., 2005); Sarah F. Liebschutz, The 
Implementation of HAVA in New York: From Antiques to High Tech, 35 PUBLIUS 597, 612–14 (2005). 
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Figure 5: Local Election Official Responses to Civil Service Proposal74 
 

CONCLUSION 
In a political system marked by partisan polarization, there is growing 
concern about partisan efforts to manipulate election laws and there are some 
misgivings about leaving election administration in the hands of partisan 
officials.75 Furthermore, some have proposed replacing partisan election officials 
with nonpartisan or bipartisan administrative bodies.76 Before considering 
proposed reforms, it is important to assess the current institutions for election 
administration. In particular, it is important to examine the attitudes of local 
election officials. Local officials represent the bureaucratic layer closest to the 
voting public, and, in our decentralized system, they enjoy considerable autonomy 
in implementing election laws. 
Overall, our findings suggest that partisan differences in the policy 
preferences of local election officials are primarily confined to those serving 
heavily populated jurisdictions. In addition, party differences among local officials 
are most evident on the photo ID issue, a policy that has been the subject of 
intense partisan debate in many states.77 Thus, those who are concerned about 
 
74. Source: 2007 Survey of Local Election Officials. 
75. Kimball & Kropf, supra note 7, at 1258–60. 
76. E.g., id. at 1259. 
77. PASTOR, supra note 19, at 3. We acknowledge that some time has passed since these 
surveys of local officials were conducted. It is possible that the partisan attitudes of local election 
officials have polarized further in the last few years as political parties have offered clearer positions 
about their election law preferences. 
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partisanship in election administration may want to focus their efforts on officials 
at the state level and in large local jurisdictions. The good news is that there are a 
relatively small number of election officials who work in heavily populated local 
jurisdictions. The bad news is that these officials serve the vast majority of voters 
in national elections, so they could be very influential. Furthermore, we did not 
find much support among local officials for civil service reform of election 
administration, though at the time of the survey many expressed “no opinion.” 
Surveys of local election officials help address reform issues by providing 
assessments of the environment in which local officials work. A substantial 
number of local officials reported that political conflict and partisan politics are 
common features of election administration. However, we found that LEO 
evaluations of state and local election administration are influenced more by 
outside forces than by the party affiliation of election officials. Reports of partisan 
conflict and dissatisfaction were more common in heavily populated local 
jurisdictions, battleground states, and places where HAVA implementation has 
created more administrative difficulties. 
Unfortunately, there is little reason to believe that the outside sources of 
political conflict will subside. Those who enforce election laws are forced to deal 
with the combatants in what Hasen calls “the voting wars.”78 Concerns about 
outside forces injecting partisanship into election administration are expressed 
clearly by Judge Paul Anderson’s dissent in the recent case of League of Women 
Voters Minnesota v. Ritchie: 
It is unfortunate that our court has been drawn into the current national 
and state conflict between political forces over how citizens can exercise 
their right to vote. Nevertheless, we are at the epicenter of this conflict’s 
highly polarized and partisan atmosphere as it plays out in Minnesota; 
thus we have no choice but to render a decision. That said, the parties 
should have been more cognizant of the distaste that courts generally, 
and our court, in particular, have for bringing a polarized, partisan 
atmosphere with them when they come to our courtrooms. It would have 
been more helpful had the parties demonstrated more objectivity in their 
arguments, and been more willing to acknowledge the law, both pro and 
con, when presenting their arguments to our court.79 
Many election administrators likely share Judge Anderson’s lament. However, we 
are not optimistic about political parties or other combatants in the voting wars 
becoming more objective or open minded when pressing their cause. It is not in 
their nature to curb their efforts. For those who are contemplating election 
administration reform, it is worth considering that outside forces may be a more 
 
78. HASEN, supra note 3, at ix–xii. 
79. League of Women Voters v. Ritchie, 819 N.W.2d 636, 694 (Minn. 2012) (Anderson, J., 
dissenting). Many thanks to Doug Chapin for bringing this opinion to our attention. 
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potent source of partisanship in election administration than the administrators 
themselves. 
  
572 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 3:551 
 
Appendix: 
Are the Survey Samples Representative? 
 
To assess whether the survey samples of local officials are representative of 
the universe of LEOs in the United States, we compared the survey samples to 
known information about the population of LEOs. Fortunately we have data on 
the universe of LEOs for two key variables in this study: the method of selection 
and the party affiliation of the local official. The first three columns in Table A1 
show the method of selection and party affiliation for the local officials in our 
survey samples. For comparative purposes, the final column shows similar figures 
for all local officials coded by Kimball and Kropf.80 The results suggest that our 
survey sample is representative of the national population of local election 
officials.81 Between fifty-four percent and sixty-four percent of the local officials 
in our sample surveys were elected, while the rest were appointed. Roughly half of 
the officials in our samples are nonpartisan officials, with the other half split fairly 
evenly between Republicans and Democrats. Other efforts comparing the survey 
samples to other information about local election officials yielded similar positive 
results.82 
  
 
80. Kimball & Kropf, supra note 7, at 1261–62. 
81. One important difference between the census and sample surveys involves coding local 
officials in Michigan, Minnesota, and Wisconsin, where election administration is shared between 
county and municipal officials. The census coded county election officials in those three states. Id. 
Meanwhile, the 2009 sample surveys interviewed municipal clerks in those three states and the 2005 
and 2007 surveys sampled primarily municipal clerks in Michigan and Wisconsin, but county officials 
in Minnesota. A large majority of county election officials in Michigan, Minnesota, and Wisconsin are 
elected. In contrast, roughly half of the municipal clerks in those three states are elected while the 
other half are appointed. This may account for the differences in the top portion of Table A1. 
82. E.g., Barry C. Burden et al., Early Voting and Election Day Registration in the Trenches: Local 
Officials’ Perceptions of Election Reform, 10 ELECTION L.J. 89, 102 (2011); Moynihan & Silva, supra note 
14, at 817–18. 
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Table A1: Comparing Survey Samples to the Population  
of Local Election Authorities83 
 
Selection Method 2005 Survey 
Sample 
2007 Survey 
Sample 
2009 Survey 
Sample 
2005 Census 
of LEOs 
Elected 64% 62% 54% 63% 
Appointed 36% 38% 46% 37% 
     
Party Affiliation     
Democrat 30% 28% 25% 26% 
Republican 22% 23% 25% 20% 
Other/Nonpartisan 48% 49% 51% 53% 
N 1357 1407 900 4612 
 
We also compared each of the survey samples in terms of demographic 
characteristics. As Table A2 shows, the demographic profiles of local officials in 
the survey samples (in terms of age, education, sex, and experience) are very 
similar. If the survey samples are biased, it is unlikely that three different randomly 
drawn samples of local officials would produce such close demographic 
characteristics. These comparisons and the relatively high response rates make us 
confident that the survey samples accurately represent the universe of local 
election officials in the United States. 
  
 
83. Note: Source for 2005 data on all local jurisdictions is Kimball and Kropf (2006). 
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Table A2: Demographic Characteristics of Local Election Authorities 
 
Sex 2005 Survey 
Sample 
2007 Survey 
Sample 
2009 Survey 
Sample 
Male 25% 23% 19% 
Female 75% 77% 81% 
    
Education    
Some High School 2% 2% 2% 
High School Graduate 20% 19% 16% 
Some College, No Degree 39% 38% 37% 
College Graduate 26% 27% 32% 
Some Graduate School 6% 6% 5% 
Graduate Degree 8% 8% 8% 
    
Organization Membership    
NACRC 14% 12% 9% 
Election Center 12% 11% 11% 
IACREOT 14% 13% 12% 
State Organization 53% 53% 49% 
    
Median Age (Years) 53 53 54 
Median Years in Current 
Position 
10 9 8 
 
